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 Should prosecutors use their position and power to take criminal justice reform into their 
own hands?1  Prosecutors have been thrust into a new space where they are forced to make blanket 
decisions about certain atypical phases in the criminal justice system.  These phases are atypical 
in that guilt is not the factual issue before the court, and although bargaining may be present, the 
process is not wholly centered around adjudication.  Decisions relating to charging, bail, and 
expungement fall into this category of atypical phases.  Traditionally, all phases of the prosecutor’s 
role have been adversarial.2  Now, the 21st century prosecutor is being put in a role where default 
adversarial posture may not make sense.  So called progressive prosecuting has created uncharted 
territory for prosecutors to take a more cooperative approach in these atypical phases of the 
criminal justice system.3  Today’s prosecutors may even be in an environment of office-wide 
mandates to deny charging of certain crimes, promote bail reform, and represent class actions of 
expungement.  Office culture that pursues these goals was unheard of in the time of the traditional 
prosecutor but is increasingly becoming normative throughout this reform movement. 
 Put simply, there is a new era of prosecutors in the 21st century.  These 21st century 
prosecutors have brought about a rise in prosecutors as primary actors for positive change in the 
face of systemic issues in the criminal justice system.  There are several reasons why prosecutorial 
reform matters for the overall reform of the criminal justice system.  Prosecutors are in fact the 
frontrunners in many phases of the system, including being the prime players in determining who 
to charge, who to release, and who has their record expunged, which have become broad points of 
 
1 See, e.g., Emily Bazelon and Miriam Krinsky, There’s a Wave of New Prosecutors. And They Mean Justice, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/opinion/how-local-prosecutors-can-reform-their-justice-
systems.html. 
2 See generally, Earl J. Shilbert, The Role of the Prosecutor in the Process of Criminal Justice , 63 A.B.A. J. 1717, 
1717-20 (1977) (detailing the role of traditional role of a prosecutor and proposing expansion).  





focus in decriminalization.  The issue of prosecutorial discretion during these phases that are not 
per se adversarial as pure adjudication of guilt exists within a larger backdrop of trends in criminal 
justice relating to an expansion of the system generally, and specifically incarceration.  Our nation 
is confronted with this issue that other constitutional actors have yet to overcome.  The United 
States of America traditionally continued to increase incarceration rates even as we had the largest 
percentages of imprisoned people in the world.4  With continual climb in convictions comes an 
increase in the disparate ratio of minorities in the system, a prevalent issue in the criminal justice 
system that is already displayed as a drastic misrepresentation of population statistics.5  Beyond 
the mere numbers of persons locked up in United States prisons or involved in the criminal justice 
system, the most shocking statistic is this disparate impact upon people of color.6  For example, in 
Wisconsin where African Americans represent six percent of the population, they make up thirty-
seven percent of the state prison population.7 
 The new approach to prosecution is arguably quasi-legislative and may be viewed to 
undermine certain priorities of other constitutional actors.  Forces both outside and inside 
prosecutor offices, including judges, elected officials, the police, and other prosecutors, are 
resisting this new era of prosecution.8  However, this prosecutorial approach can also bring 
prosecutors to the forefront of positive change in the criminal justice system to combat the plague 
of high incarceration rates.  There is little governing law for the prosecutorial role in the atypical 
 
4 See generally, Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Yes, U.S. Locks People Up at a Higher Rate Than Any Other Country, 
WASHINGTON POST, July 7, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/07/yes-u-s-locks-
people-up-at-a-higher-rate-than-any-other-country/. 
5 See generally, MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (detailing the disparate impact of the criminal justice system on people of color). 
6 Id. 
7 See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Milwaukee Experiment: What Can One Prosecutor Do About the Mass Incarceration 
of African Americans, N.Y. TIMES, May. 4, 2015, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/11/the-milwaukee-
experiment. 





phases of charging, bail, and expungement, but other criminal justice actors and academics have 
made separation of powers arguments against sweeping progressive reform.  Still, these arguments 
beg the question of whether prosecutors becoming de facto policy makers is justified, and if so, on 
what grounds.  Some argue the answer to this question rests on ethical considerations, such as the 
goal of decriminalization and reduction of disparate impact on minorities, which should override 
any contradictory approach by the legislature.   
 The ultimate question of whether prosecutors should use their position and power to take 
criminal justice reform into their own hands includes a follow up question to determine what legal 
and ethical principles should provide guidance.  There are different theories, including guidance 
from the Supreme Court and the separation of powers doctrine, to the Model Rules, to line 
prosecution norms and internal office culture.  Whether the criminal justice system should value 
uniformity and clarity or diversity and creativity, and whether the answer should be in a 
neighborhood-by-neighborhood, office-by-office, state-by-state or nationwide form, has been 
debated by many legal scholars and criminal justice actors. 
 This paper contributes to the above-mentioned discussions.  First, this paper identifies both 
the power prosecutors have in exercising discretion in the atypical phases of charging, bail, and 
expungement and the need and opportunity for positive change at such phases.  Second, this paper 
explores how this new era of progressive prosecuting has restructured the prosecutorial role in 
these atypical phases.  Third, this paper compiles potential theories of guidance for prosecutors 
based in legal and ethical principles by canvasing the possible paths for guiding the new era 
prosecutor. 
 To accomplish the above three goals, this paper is broken into four parts.  Part I is a current 




prosecutor’s offices.  The 21st century prosecutor examples are juxtaposed against the traditional 
role prosecutors were encouraged to take prior to the reform movement.  These illustrations depict 
the significance of prosecutorial discretion for pursuing criminal justice reform.  Next, Part II 
analyzes the specific atypical phases of charging, bail, and expungement.  First, it identifies the 
traditional role of prosecutors at each phase.  Second, it explores various reform movements of 
each stage and the impact each reform may have on the criminal justice issues of mass 
incarceration and disparate impact.  Part III then moves the discussion to different theories of 
guidance for how prosecutors should navigate this new space.  This discussion includes arguments 
against prosecutor’s acting in a quasi-legislative role based on separation of powers principles and 
limited governing law for these phases.  But it argues that there are many potential legal and ethical 
principles that could provide guidance for the 21st century prosecutor.  Potentially, such nuances 
in ethical arguments may lean towards progressive prosecutors using their power for positive 
change, even in the face of backlash from other constitutional actors.  Part III is divided into two 
subparts – law and ethics, analyzing seminal cases in the legal realm, the model rules, and office 
culture and norms for an ethical backdrop.  Part IV concludes this paper with a canvasing of how 
prosecution, and even progressive prosecution with similar goals, can look different based on 
which theory an office may rely.  Theories may work differently for different phases and in 
different areas of the country, thus, the purpose of this paper is not necessarily to select a solution 
to over-criminalization through prioritizing theories for what the prosecutorial role should look 
like.  Instead, the purpose of this paper is to provide a descriptive contribution of potential 
prosecutorial roles in the atypical phases of charging, bail, and expungement and the impact 





I. RISE OF THE NEW PROSECUTOR AS A PRIMARY ACTOR FOR CHANGE 
 This part addresses the phenomenon known as “the rise of the new prosecutors” within the 
broader backdrop of movements towards criminal justice reform.  Namely, how progressive 
prosecuting can reduce mass incarceration and disparate impact on minorities.  It begins with the 
idea of what the traditional prosecutorial role consists of and how such a tough on crime traditional 
mold may have played the largest role in over-criminalization.  It next continues to discuss the rise 
of progressive prosecuting and goes on to juxtapose a new movement among progressive 
prosecutors against the traditionally adversarial model.  Further, it discusses how prosecutors have 
the power to use their position for positive change through this new movement. 
A. Traditional Prosecutors: Adversarial and Adjudicative  
 Prosecutors have traditionally played an adversarial role with a narrow sphere of 
responsibility in the criminal justice system.9  This role was typically composed of receiving cases, 
filing charges, adjudicating a plea or trial and moving on to the next case.10  Until the 21st century, 
this idea of the prosecutorial role perpetuated systemic issues in the criminal justice system due to 
culture and resource limitations.11  Resource scarcity today means a rationing of criminal justice 
away from over-criminalization and over-incarceration, but before the push for reform, it did not 
necessarily generate accordance with the public’s sense of justice.12  It largely meant that 
prosecutor offices lacked the capacity or the support to address crime problems holistically.13  
Instead prosecutors were more a part of a binary system, where the aim was to be adversarial and 
representation of the State may not have necessarily reflected representation of the people.  In 
 
9 Shilbert, supra note 2. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Bibas, Stephanos, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion , FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP AT PENN LAW, 1427, (2010), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1427. 




adversarial postures, the legal profession often painted prosecutors as conservative, severe, and 
unforgiving.14  The overall aim of this hard-nosed traditional prosecutor boiled down to one 
concept: enforcing the law.15 
 Execution of the law used to mean being tough on crime, which in turn, meant locking 
people up to protect the public.16  Legal scholars have argued that such tough on crime prosecution 
bears a majority of the responsibility for the mass incarceration issue of the United States.17  This 
argument blames mass incarceration on prosecutorial dominance,18 and that previous deference to 
prosecutorial discretion meant severe punishment and severe consequences.19 But the rationale 
behind the power of a traditional prosecutor can be used to support the rationale behind the power 
of a progressive one.  It is a two headed coin.  If prosecutors make decisions to charge, request bail 
conditions, essentially keep a person in jail or with a criminal record hanging over them, 
prosecutors can also decide not to; that is exactly what progressive prosecutors are doing.  
Progressive prosecutors are breaking the traditional law-and-order mold of their role in the 
criminal justice system. 
B. The Power of the Local Prosecutor in a New Wave of Reform 
 Analyzing the criminal justice system involves analyzing power and analyzing the 
consequences of prosecutors’ decisions shows the brunt of that power.20  Some scholars argue 
 
14 See, e.g., Jennifer Gonnerman, Larry Krasner’s Campaign to End Mass Incarceration, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2018, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/29/larry-krasners-campaign-to-end-mass-incarceration. 
15 See generally JOHN L. WORRALL & M. ELAINE NUGENT-BORAKOVE, THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR at 4 (2017). 
16 See, e.g., David Lat, How Tough-on-Crime Prosecutors Contribute to Mass Incarceration , N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/08/books/review/emily-bazelon-charged.html. 
17 Id. 
18 See generally JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL 
REFORM (2017) (assessing prosecutor’s role in exploding incarceration rates). 
19 Barkow, supra note 8. 





whether prosecutors should have the power to impact change on the criminal justice system, but 
almost all scholars opine that prosecutors wield this power.  Many legal scholars consider 
prosecutors as the most powerful actor in the criminal justice system.21  Local district attorneys 
straddle a line between the judiciary and the legislature, in between the court system and the world 
of politics.22  Despite the traditional method of prosecution prior to the 21st century, it is plausible 
that prosecutors can use their role to respond to crime problems and overall systemic issues in 
criminal justice.23  Beyond executing the law, prosecutors hold the potential to influence law 
enforcement through various phases in administering justice.24  Prosecutors have evolved into 
powerful political figures, often in response to democratic input from their communities 
encouraging progressive movements.25 Prosecutors can use such power to pursue positive change 
in the criminal justice system.    
 Local prosecutors are the most highly involved constitutional actors in the criminal justice 
system at the ground level and have enough discretion to create change.26  Local prosecutors handle 
ninety-five percent of the criminal cases brought in the United States, 27 fourteen times as many 
felonies and several hundred times as many misdemeanors as federal prosecutors.28  Thus, local 
prosecutors are positioned to handle reform through their broad discretion on whether and how to 
prosecute.29  Prosecutors can generate decriminalization and dismantle mass incarceration through 
reforms starting at the outset of a case through declining to charge certain low-level offenses30 and 
 
21 See, e.g., Bellin, The Limits of Prosecutorial Power, 




26 See, e.g., Bazelon and Krinsky, There’s a Wave of New Prosecutors. And They Mean Justice . 
27 Id. 
28 See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011). 





continue after release through expungement efforts.31  For example, in Brooklyn, New York, 
District Attorney Eric Gonzalez advances the principle of routing low-level offenders out of the 
criminal justice system.32  Likewise, the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office declines to 
prosecute cases involving marijuana possession and smoking in public.33  Further, under the 
direction of some prosecutors advocating criminal justice reform, New York state has moved to 
clear records of marijuana convictions based on disproportionate effects on New Yorkers of 
color.34  The efforts were led by both district attorneys and defense providers that are traditionally 
adversaries.35  Manhattan District Attorney Cy Vance Jr. spoke to the new cooperative posture, 
describing feeling of honor to work with defense attorneys in order to help ex-offenders by 
removing unnecessary obstacles to necessary rights like employment, housing, and education.36 
 Reform to combat over-criminalization and its impact on people of color has swept the 
country and created a visible contrast from the traditional tough on crime prosecutor persona to 
the form of progressive prosecutor making promises.37  These promises can be summarized to 
include less incarceration and more fairness and have increasingly become bi-partisan issues.38  
This prosecutorial approach to justice has been dubbed more lenient than the prior traditional 
adversarial posture.39  Prosecutors are rethinking whether and how to bring about charges and what  
ensuring a fair process really means for the prosecutorial role.40  These progressive prosecutors 
 
31 See, e.g., Azi Paybarah, About 160,000 People in New York to See Their Marijuana Convictions Disappear, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/nyregion/marijuana-records-new-york-city.html. 
32 See, e.g., Bazelon and Krinsky, There’s a Wave of New Prosecutors. And They Mean Justice. 
33 See, e.g., Paybarah, About 160,000 People in New York to See Their Marijuana Convictions Disappear . 
34 Id. 
35 Press Release, Manhattan DA, Through Groundbreaking Class Action, Hundreds of New Yorkers Have Old 
Marijuana Convictions Sealed (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.manhattanda.org/through-groundbreaking-class-action-
hundreds-of-new-yorkers-have-old-marijuana-convictions-sealed/. 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., Bazelon and Krinsky, There’s a Wave of New Prosecutors. And They Mean Justice. 
38 Id. 
39 See, e.g., Bellin, The Limits of Prosecutorial Power, 





have not only declined to charge certain low-level offenses, but also declined to ask for bail in 
many misdemeanor cases.41   
 However, reform can be state by state and even office by office specific.  Proponents for 
community-based prosecution reform propose that reform to reimagine the prosecutorial role could 
even be neighborhood by neighborhood based to reflect the fundamental democratic process.42  
Neighborhood by neighborhood-based offices would be accountable and transparent to the 
community they serve with a checks and balances system rooted in democracy.43 
 No matter the form, progressive prosecutors are popping up all over the country as agents 
of change.  It is worth mentioning that although prosecutors are displaying power to create positive 
change on a case-by-case basis, without the support of other criminal justice actors, this reform 
may not last.44  Prosecutors are not the only constitutional actors in the criminal justice system; 
the legislature writes the laws and judges have the ultimate say over decisions such as bail.45  When 
assessing the terrain of reform, it is important to realize that prosecutors operate within the 
boundaries set by these other actors and therefore have restricted and not absolute power.46  
Prosecutors still play an important part in criminal justice reform, but often on a case-by case 
basis.47   
 Due to these limitations on the prosecutorial role and opponents against policy change 
initiated by prosecutors, it is important to analyze the atypical phases where prosecutors have the 
most power to step out of their traditional roles.  Understanding the traditional prosecutorial role 




43 See generally STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE. 







how prosecutors can effect positive change.  Further, conceptualizing the theories of guidance for 
effecting positive change at each of these phases can help show potential outcomes of what the 
21st century prosecutor looks like and what the next century’s criminal justice system could look 
like. 
II. AYTPICAL PHASES IN PROSECUTION AS BROAD POINTS OF FOCUS  
 This part narrows in on how prosecutors have become policy makers in addition to 
traditional role of receiving evidence, bringing charges, bargaining, or going to trial in phases of 
the criminal justice system that are not wholly adjudicative.  These phases were traditionally all 
adverse to the defense even though the purpose of such phases were not to determine the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant.  There has been a renewed examination of the prosecutorial role in 
promoting cooperation in the atypical phases of pre-trial hearings, bail, and post-conviction 
reentry, based on reform movements for decriminalization and prosecutorial enforcement.  This 
part will describe in turn the juxtaposition of the prosecutorial role during the atypical phases of 
charging, bail, and expungement.  The new movement has shined a light on these phases that were 
typically not given much attention.  The consequence of illuminating prosecutorial discretion in 
these atypical phases is that the role of a prosecutor is in the legal and academic spotlight more 
than ever.  This part will show how progressive prosecutors are becoming both pseudo-adversarial 
and quasi-legislative through displaying the potential influence prosecutors have in each phase and 
in the criminal justice system, including reducing incarceration rates and disparate impact on 







A. Deciding to Use the Full Power of Discretion  
 Many legal scholars argue that prosecutorial discretion in making decisions to charge is the 
greatest extent of a prosecutor’s power.48  This great power may be heightened by the vast number 
of laws passed by the legislature, but the prosecutor’s politics may hold the most weight to place 
an individual behind bars.49  Some legal scholars have even argued that the power of prosecutors 
to decide who to charge is almost entirely unrestrained and the most important link in the chain of 
the criminal system process.50  In the past, prosecutors who were tough on crime may have leaned 
towards a modern tendency of overcharging.51  Especially during the 1980’s and 1990’s, some 
prosecutors used their power of discretion to increase incarceration rates, but in the current 
movement, prosecutorial power may cut the other way – decreasing incarceration.52  
 Jumping forward to the 21st century, incarceration rates are still high, but in cities like 
Philadelphia who held the highest incarceration rate of the ten largest cities in America, diversity 
and progressivism within the city’s residents combat tough on crime policies.53  At this local level, 
progressive prosecutors are winning elections.54  Even former President Barack Obama promoted 
effecting change on the disparate impact of the criminal justice system through voting for 
prosecutors who are viewing prosecution in a new light.55 Many legal scholars and criminal justice 
actors have expressed concerns about the impact of selective prosecuting on race and 
 
48 Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime , 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 102, 103, (2013), http://www.columbialawreview.org/ham-sandwich-nation_Reynolds.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 104. 
51 Id. at 105. 
52 Can and Should Judges Demand Prosecutors Provide Written Explanations for Dismissals and Plea Deals? 
Sentencing Law and Policy Blog (Aug. 17, 2020),  
https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2020/08/can-and-should-judges-demand-prosecutors-
provide-a-written-explanations-for-dismissals-and-plea-deal.html. 






overcriminalization,56 but this overwhelming prosecutorial power can be used for progressive 
efforts as well.   
 Prosecutors are employing progressive efforts by making macro-legislative style decisions.  
For District Attorney Larry Krasner in Philadelphia, District Attorney Rachel Rollins in Boston, 
and other newly elected prosecutors, this means delivering change through decisions to stop 
prosecuting certain crimes, including driving with a suspended license, drug possession and 
shoplifting.57  Internal efforts such as these may deliver more of an impact on systemic issues in 
the criminal justice system than other external efforts.58  Further, such internal efforts to use the 
power of discretion to combat mass incarceration can operate like law.59  Local prosecutors can 
announce general policies about charging that create a norm of declining to charge entire categories 
of cases.60 
 Although the discretion wielded by prosecutors of the ‘80’s and ‘90’s was met with little 
interference, now reformers who are flipping the coin of discretion are sometimes met with 
pushback.61  For example, in Arlington County, Virginia, county judges are questioning 
prosecutorial discretion wielded in this oppositive way.62  Progressive prosecutors in areas like 
Arlington face opposition from not-so-progressive judges who have recently become enthusiastic 
to review and regulate decisions to charge.63  Some proponents of the reform movement rally for 
a transparent review process as well,  but typically seek explanations only for decisions to use 
 
56 Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 127-128 (2008). 
57 See, e.g., Gonnerman, Larry Krasner’s Campaign to End Mass Incarceration . 
58 Miller & Wright, supra note 56. 
59 Id. 
60 Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutors and their State and Local Polities, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 823 (2020), 
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol110/iss4/6 . 







governmental power to charge and not forgoing such power in deciding not to charge.64  On either 
side of the debate, this leads to follow up questions about whether prosecutors were elected to 
exercise this power and both whether and how prosecutors can reform the criminal justice system 
if met with such resistance. 
 Resistance can also come from prosecutors who have fit the traditional mold throughout 
their career.65  District Attorney’s like Larry Krasner in Philadelphia often turn to promotion of 
progressive office culture and training, but sometimes the only option is restructuring.66  Beyond 
buy-in from justice system actors, support must also come from funding partners in the community 
to support any discretionary decisions that led to alternative paths of prosecution.  Prosecutorial 
discretion comes with the power to divert defendants from the criminal justice system to treatment, 
rehabilitation, or community service programs, but financial resources may still hinder the 
possibility of change.67 
B. Bailing Out the Bail System 
 Financial resources are also at the crux of another restructuring effort – bail reform.  The 
traditional use of setting bail essentially equated itself to purchasing pre-trial release.68  The 
purpose of bail was, and still is, to assure court appearance for those who were assumed not to be 
a threat to public safety, but de facto detention occurred too often of those with the inability to 
afford to post.69  Historically, bail was set high for most offences for the purpose of flight 
 
64 Id. 
65 See, e.g., Gonnerman, Larry Krasner’s Campaign to End Mass Incarceration . 
66 Id. 
67 See Generally, Beth McCann, Courtney Oliva & Ronald Wright, Prosecution Office Culture and Diversion 
Programs, 21 WASH. CRIM. L. REP. 33 (2020),  
https://e1e6cfc6-b1d4-4e45-b03c 22d8c290e050.filesusr.com/ugd/e009e5_b2b1f668d03449dbada3b1a0538b5a35.  
68 Carol Trilling Linker & Stephen F. Sloan, NEW YORK SENATE RESEARCH SERVICE TASK FORCE ON CRITICAL 






prevention, community safety and, some would argue, punishment.70  It is this later traditional 
component that receives the most attack today.  For decades, reformers have criticized the 
traditional bail system for its inevitable disparate effect on indigent defendants in the face of 
constitutional guarantees to not be excessive.71  These guarantees were only supported by a limited 
range of options for pretrial conditions, with judges often choosing cash bail.72  Some studies show 
that failure to post amounts for forty percent of jail populations.73  However, many bail statutes, 
like the one in New York, proclaim that the bail system is not unconstitutional under either the 
equal protection or the due processes clauses of both the United States Constitution and their 
respective state constitutions.74  The bail system was traditionally, and in some states still is, 
governed under the assumption that a right to bail was discretionary as long as it was not excessive, 
but bail statutes in reforming states like New York, have written in a right to bail in the absence of 
a sufficient reason for denial.75  The applicable New York statute has created bail as a matter of 
right for misdemeanor cases and as a matter of discretion for greater offenses.  76 
 The Bail Reform Act has undergone various construction, but reform today essentially 
exaggerates the ‘shall not be excessive’ boundary on setting bail.  The basic framework is that 
people should be released under the least restrictive conditions that still assure court appearance 
and public safety.77  Even at the height of the tough on crime prosecutorial philosophy, the 
 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 9. 
72 See, e.g., Taryn A. Merkl, New York’s Latest Bail Law Changes Explained , BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, April 
16, 2020, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/new-yorks-latest-bail-law-changes-explained. 
73 Id. 
74 N.Y. CONST. ART I, § 5. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 




Supreme Court, advocated that detention should be a carefully considered exception to society’s 
norm of liberty.78 
 But until progressive prosecutors have contributed to these least restrictive measures to 
mean not letting one’s wallet be the difference in the likelihood of dentition, detention was not a 
carefully considered exception.  Current bail reform recognizes this systemic issue and includes 
making more crimes eligible for cash bail, but more important to the movement, expanding pretrial 
release conditions beyond cash.79  The movement seeks to attack the depredation of the 
presumption of innocence of people jailed for failure to pay and the contribution to already 
staggering and disproportionate prison populations.80  Research shows that detainment can have 
drastic consequences, including likelihood of fostering a plea deal even if innocent.81  Prosecutors’ 
contributions of avoiding asking for bail and taking into account more factors, including a person’s 
legal history and status, are considered high-impact policies against such dramatic results.82   
 Like the charging phase, local prosecutors are taking the wheel to be the policy impactors.83  
Local prosecutors have discretion at the bail setting phase for any case.84  Progressive offices, like 
the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, have erected office wide mandates to not seek bail for 
an array of charges.85 
 
78 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
79 See, e.g., Taryn A. Merkl, supra note 72. 
80 Id. 
81 See, e.g., Diana Dabruzzo, New Jersey Set Out to Reform Its Cash Bail System. Now, the Results Are In , ARNOLD 
VENTURES, Nov. 14, 2019, https://www.arnoldventures.org/stories/new-jersey-set-out-to-reform-its-cash-bail-
system-now-the-results-are-in/. 
82 See, e.g., Stephanie Wykstra , Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted People From Jail, Explained, 








 However, some criminal justice actors find bail reform at odds with the traditional role of 
the prosecutor to promote public safety.  A study done in Cook County, Illinois86 and the New 
York Police Department87 argue that such reform increases crime.  Further, court systems worry 
lack of funding will stop reform before it can even get on its feet.88  Some judges, like a few in 
Bronx County, New York, even work around reform by setting a bail amount too high for indigent 
defendants to pay, appearing to have the goal of defeating the intent of the new legislature and 
returning to the old ways.89  In fact, it is ultimately the judge who sets bail with the discretion to 
override a prosecutor’s recommendation.90 
 Despite the opposition, reformers push for change in this pretrial phase due to the vast 
negative penalties that detention can have on a person.91  Even detainment for a short period of 
time pretrial can dramatically impact a person’s ability to retain their job, housing, children, and 
driver’s license.92   
C. Forgiving and Forgetting Past Crimes for Future Rights 
 If pretrial detention can have such a damaging and lasting impact on a person’s rights, 
being incarcerated because of conviction or taking a plea, can destroy someone’s future.  Having 
a criminal record generates collateral consequences that will continue to regulate the lives of ex-
offenders long after they have left prison.93  Being in the system traditionally meant being 
 
86 See, e.g., Merkl, supra note 72. 
87 See, e.g., Tina Moore & Jorge Fitz-Gibbon, Bail Reform a Significant Reason for Crime Spike, NYPD says, N.Y. 
POST, March 5, 2020, https://nypost.com/2020/03/05/bail-reform-a-significant-reason-for-crime-spike-nypd-says/. 
88 See generally, Glenn A. Grant, J.A.D., Acting Administrative Director of the Courts, New Jersey Courts, Report to 
the Governor and the Legislature (2018). 
89 See, e.g., Akash Mehta , A Broken Bond: How New York Judges Are Getting Around Bail Reform, THE CITY, Oct. 
12, 2020, https://www.thecity.nyc/2020/10/12/21512018/new-york-judges-getting-around-bail-reform-bond. 
90 See, e.g., Bellin, The Limits of Prosecutorial Power, 
91 See, e.g., Dabruzzo, New Jersey Set Out to Reform Its Cash Bail System. Now, the Results Are In . 
92 Id. 
93 See, e.g., Reuben Jonathan Miller, How Thousands of American Laws Keep People ‘Imprisoned’ Long After They’re 





imprisoned after release by means of restrictions in where a person could work and live, and even 
how they could receive an education or participate in democracy.94  Reformers have dubbed ex-
offenders as stuck in a state of quasi-citizenship materialized by legislative agendas.95  After being 
held on the inside, ex-offenders enter the outside world to face a similar alienation, and with 
disparate proportions in prison populations, people of color inevitably face disparate impact when 
re-entering society as well.96  However, expungement rests on the policy of allowing an ex-
offender to move on from such identity and create a new future without grave restrictions on their 
rights.97 
 There are similarities in the motivations behind the law of expungement and the goals of 
reformers, such that both have roots in sympathetic policymakers,98 but expungement as a remedy 
was welcomed on a smaller and more boundary-filled scale than reformers hope for today.  In 
addition, expungement and sealing efforts were traditionally paid little attention in terms of actual 
results99 unlike the goal of reformers who now wish to evaluate its benefits.  States have always 
had varied available expungement remedies and continue to have different expungement and 
sealing laws with remaining procedural hurdles.100  In the legal world, expungement is 
characterized as a forgetting form of relief and sealing a record is characterized a forgiving form 
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petitioners for expunging or sealing their records needed to overcome a presumption of retaining 
criminal records available for public record and often boundless paperwork.102 
 Reformers are pushing back against the hurdles before ex-offenders, both upon reentry and 
in efforts to petition for expungement.  The movement, and even the so-called progressive 
prosecutor, encourages measures to expand the number and type of convictions eligible for 
expungement,103 reduce waiting time to be able to petition for expungement,104 and lowering the 
number of procedural requirements that need to be met to satisfy the burden for petitioning.105  So-
called clean slate states have even considered automatic expungement or sealing of certain types 
of lessor offenses.106  Michigan was recently the sixth state to offer this automatic relief and also 
expanded petition-based relief for most misdemeanors and some felonies.107  But even clean slate 
states, the remaining procedural hurdles continue to grant prosecutors mechanisms by which to 
either stall or hasten the process.108   
 Prosecutors are often the first point of review of a petition for expungement, and in some 
states, are the final point of objection.109  In most states, although judges are typically the final 
authority, prosecutors are themselves judges on the merits of a petition.110  Further, state statutes 
like New York’s § 216 leave room for prosecutors to act in this quasi-judicial way, including that 
a good cause showing can be considered under the interests of the public and the parties, which 
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impliedly includes the State.111  The movement today is against using these considerations and 
procedural hurdles to stall the process.  Instead, progressive prosecutors go further than simply not 
objecting to petitions for expungement but promote affirmative actions to help hasten the process 
for certain categories of crime.  These affirmative actions can take the form of meeting with 
employers to encourage hiring of people with past criminal records, like District Attorney Ben 
David in Wilmington, North Carolina.  DA David explained these active steps as a method to stop 
prosecuting ex-offenders to help with reentry.112 
III. GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE NEW PROSECUTORIAL ROLE 
 Part I established the rise of a new era of prosecution.  Part II explained how prosecutors 
are in positions that may demand more scrutiny in their role.  With these concepts discussed in the 
above parts, now it is important to explore the ways to conceive of a prosecutor’s role in atypical 
phases.  This part is an exploration of the theories of prosecution among legal scholars and the 
potential guiding legal and ethical principles for prosecutors in the face of progressive reform in 
phases that were mainly governed by tradition.   
A. Theories of Prosecution: Justice Doers or Legal Servants  
 There is no generally accepted theory of the prosecutorial role,113 but some legal scholars 
conceive prosecutors as agents of the populace.  Naturally, the lack of normative theory for the 
prosecutorial role has implications in how prosecutors may act during charging, bail, and 
expungement decisions.  Two leading theories include the “do justice” model and the “servant of 
the law” theory of prosecutorial behavior.114  Yet, there is disconcertion among constitutional 
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actors about what each of these theories mean.115  Judges may use the “do justice” slogan to 
criticize prosecutorial failure, while legislatures may point to the idea as prosecutorial duty, and 
prosecutors themselves may practice the concept as a rationale for power wielding.116 
 The “do justice” model is malleable to how prosecutors wish to wield their power 
irrespective of whether their goal is to be traditionally tough on crime or progressively reform.  In 
the traditional sense, prosecutors can claim they are doing justice by being more severe in the 
phases of charging, bail, and expungement.  On the other hand, prosecutors like those in 
Philadelphia seek justice for society by being more lenient in those phases.117  Prosecutors on either 
side of the reform movement embrace the “do justice” model, but the lack of uniformity in 
conceptualizing the prosecutorial role undermines any uniformity in what justice means for this 
model.118  Conceptualizing prosecutors as justice doers only undermines any clear guidance for 
the prosecutorial role and generates further ambiguity on how prosecutors should act in any 
phase.119  Even when the “do justice” model is embraced, it does not legally govern the 
prosecutorial role.  Prosecutors are only legally bound to comply with applicable rules of procedure 
and case precedent.120 
 Legal scholar Jeffery Bellin argues that shifting from this “do justice” model to the “servant 
of the law” paradigm would keep justice related concerns at the forefront but with a more 
consistency to promote clear guidance.121  Prosecutors would no longer mechanically enforce 
criminal statutes but weigh constitutional significances such as due process and procedural 
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protections like discovery requirements.122  Bellin argues this shift would lesson tension between 
the prosecutorial role and the progressive prosecutor movement.123  His argument focuses on how 
an orientation from this paradigm should highlight the underlying mission of the criminal justice 
system rather than appearing to override the actions of other constitutional actors.124  Progressive 
prosecutors could subvert backlash as zealous servants to the law and current existing legal rules, 
finding a particular shield in defendant-protective rules that support cooperation.125  By following 
the lead of the applicable background law, prosecutors can be less adversarial and more lenient 
when the law allows in the phases of charging, bail and expungement.126  When the law provides 
for prosecutorial choices without guidance,  the default would be leniency, but when deviation 
from the default is necessary, there is likely to be transparency and consistency.127 
 However, the “servant of the law” theory narrows the role of a prosecutor, may still receive 
opposition as a different means to the same end, and has limited legal guidance to draw from.128  
There are still issues with potential criticism no matter being grounded in such limited background 
law and opposers can still argue that certain laws may run counter to such progressive reform.  At 
the heart of this debate is the narrowing of the prosecutorial function such that other actors in the 
criminal justice system hold similar responsibility to ensure justice.129  Arguably, a narrowing of 
the scope of a prosecutor’s role may take some of their power away necessary to effect positive 
change in a way counter to the objective of the reform movement.  Further, with limited legal 
guidance, deviation from default would likely be the norm and not the exception. 
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B. Limited Legal Principles and the Separation of Powers Limitation 
 There is little governing law for a prosecutor’s role particularly in the phases of charging, 
bail, and expungement.  Opposers to the reform movement expect prosecutors to always have their 
role fully grounded in the enforcement and not in the creation of the law.  But the new era 
prosecutors rest their decisions to decarcerate on legal policy grounds about their role in enforcing 
justice.130  At the center of the legal argument against reform stands the separation of powers 
doctrine.  Critics against prosecutorial discretion used in this way say prosecutors are responsible 
for upholding the law, but progressive prosecution is undermining it.131  For instance, in opposition 
to prosecutors’ decisions not to charge, critics argue for a prosecutor’s traditional role and against 
crossing the line between executive and legislative powers.132  Further, in making blanket decisions 
against charging, for other bail conditions, or for expungement, prosecutors are exercising a refusal 
of enforcement that effectively rewrites law.133  
 Some cases, like Ayala v. Scott, show how perceived prosecutorial overstepping into 
another constitutional actor’s realm have reached state court.134  Aramis Ayala, an elected Florida 
prosecutor met criticism for her decisions to not pursue the death penalty for any charge.135  In 
Florida, Governor Rick Scott attempted to take back his power by using his constitutional authority 
to reassign criminal cases from Ayala’s office under the legal requirement of good reason – that 
reason was rooted in the separation of powers.136  Governor Scott claimed that separation of powers 
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meant that he had a good reason to reassign cases from Ayala’s office is Ayala was exercising 
legislative rather than executive power.137 
 Some Supreme Court rulings have touched on prosecutorial law and has made some 
pronouncements of how they conceive a prosecutor’s role as a matter of law.  The Supreme Court 
holds prosecutors as representatives of the sovereign with an obligation to govern impartially and 
an interest in justice above winning at all costs.138  Further, the Court found prosecutors “may 
strike hard blows, [but are] not at liberty to strike foul ones.139  The problem is that different 
constitutional actors of different jurisdictions have different ideas of what foul blows means.  
However, there are some cases that can lead to inferences that prosecutors must not always be 
adversarial.  For example, prosecutors must not suppress evidence favorable to a defendant, and 
instead must turn such evidence over to presumedly help the defense.140 
C. Model Rules Against Mass Incarceration  
 Beyond legal principles, ethical guidance begs to outweigh any quasi-legislative concerns 
of a prosecutor’s action with systemic issues in the criminal justice system.  However, the Model 
Rules and their adaptions by the states are lacking as a balancing mechanism of what a prosecutor 
should do.  In the face of this reform, there is a concern of whether Model Rule 3.8 needs to be 
updated.  Currently, Model Rule 3.8 only uniformly provides guidance on the phase of charging 
such that prosecutors shall refrain from charging without being supporting by probable cause.141  
This leaves a vast amount of room for discretion in charging.  Further, without any mention of bail 
or expungement in Model Rule 3.8, prosecutors have almost complete ethical discretion on their 
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role in those phases.  Thus, an update to the model rules about the prosecutorial role in non-
adjudicative phases could alleviate concerns about limited uniform guidance in local prosecutor 
reform.  Some legal scholars argue for consistency of process in guiding prosecutor’s case 
management decisions at the charging, bail, and expungement phases to achieve reformist goals 
against racial injustice and mass incarceration.142 
 On the other hand, the lack of binding principles leaves room for creativity, but there is 
still little ethical clarity on how a prosecutor can use their roles in non-adjudicative phases.  Office 
culture with policy driven motives is used to challenge the lack of legal guidance with a movement 
from within.  But these movements within local prosecutor offices lack uniformity as well.  Still, 
there are arguments of whether diversity and creativity should triumph over uniformity and overall 
clarity because what makes sense in one jurisdiction may not make sense in another.  Further, 
some legal scholars argue that reform should be based on a democratic process of community or 
neighborhood input.143  For example, in exploring declinations to charge through use of 
prosecutorial discretion, legal scholars have argued that loyalties to local votes should influence 
such office-wide mandates.144  This duty to local polities can be supported under justifications of 
limited resources as well.145  
 In every jurisdiction and for each atypical phase, moral principles have justified 
progressive reform against systemic issues both underlying and created by mass incarceration.  
First, there are concerns of whether prison has the desired effect on an individual or a negative 
cyclical effect.146  Second, even if prison may have desired effects on some, every offender may 
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not deserve or rehabilitate from the full extent of the criminal justice process.147  Third, beyond 
arguments of desert, prison will almost certainly have a negative impact on ex-inmates.  Being 
incarcerated not only cuts prisoners off from their loved ones and their place in society, upon 
release ex-offenders have a hard reentering society, with limited rights in terms of jobs, housing, 
education, and voting.148   
IV. PRESCRIPTION FOR PROSECUTOR ACTION IN ATYPICAL PHASES   
 After an exploration of the potential guiding legal and ethical principles for prosecutors 
choosing progressive reform in phases that were mainly governed by tradition, it is necessary to 
canvas the application of these different theories behind conceiving a prosecutor’s role today.  
There was traditionally a way a prosecutor should act, but now there is a menu of options for how 
a prosecutor can act in the atypical phases of charging, bail, and expungement.  This part is not 
necessarily creating a solution to the problem faced by the movement, but instead presents all 
facets of the problem.  Prosecutors as democratic representatives may mean different things in 
different jurisdictions and for different phases.  Therefore, this part will create a map of the effects 
of various theories and the lack of formal legal or ethical guidance on the different atypical phases.  
A. Wielding Discretion under Discretionary Theories  
 Prosecutors hold some of the greatest power in the criminal justice system through 
discretion in making decisions to charge.149  This great power may be almost unrestrained,150 and 
one of the key phases prosecutors can use to either be traditionally tough on crime by 




149 Reynolds, supra note 48 at 103. 
150 Id. at 104. 
151 Id. at 105. 





Progressive prosecutors argue overcriminalization continues to be a major problem in the United 
States which has retrospective concerns about selective prosecuting on mass incarceration and 
disparate impact on race,153 but prosecutors can also use this power to combat these criminal justice 
issues. 
 The “do justice” model offers a means for prosecutors to wield their power with the goal 
of progressive form.  Prosecutors can support their blanket decisions not to charge on the grounds 
of doing justice for society.  However, there are few legal factors binding prosecutors, and only 
one ethical suggestion in Model Rule 3.8, which only requires prosecutors to refrain from charging 
without being supporting by probable cause.154  This leaves room for backlash by way of separation 
of powers augments.  In opposition to prosecutors’ decisions not to charge, critics argue the line 
between executive and legislative powers is crossed.155   
 The “servant of the law” theory is equally as unclear in terms of guidance.  Prosecutors can 
use this theory to support decisions not to charge, or to charge more leniently, 156 by weighing the 
constitutional significances as due process and defendant-protective procedural protections.157  
Scholars suggest that when there is no background law on how to act, prosecutors should act with 
leniency as a default,158 but in decisions to charge, the background legal guidance is sparse.  Like 
the “do justice” model, the ambiguity in the “servant of the law” theory leaves open room for 
separation of powers critiques.  Prosecutors only have limited case precedent to combat such 
opposers. 159   
 
153 Miller & Wright, supra note 56. 
154 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2020). 
155 Wright, supra note 60. 
156 Bellin, supra note 113. 
157 Id. at 1214. 
158 Bellin, supra note 113.  




 Prosecutors like those in Philadelphia160  and Boston161  seem to apply the justice doers of 
society concept through stopping the prosecution of crimes that tend to do more harm when 
punishing the individual than to society when committed.  These crimes include driving with a 
suspended license, drug possession and shoplifting.162  Such prosecutors employ a progressive “do 
justice” model to impact systemic issues in the criminal justice system by way of internal efforts 
and office culture. 163  But these internal efforts can operate like law,164  because local prosecutors 
can mandate office-wide policies.165 
 Prosecutors acting in this quasi-legislative way face an uphill battle against not-so-
progressive judges who have recently become enthusiastic to review and regulate decisions to 
charge. 166  Legislatures may also move for such discretion to have a transparent review process.167  
Beyond outside constitutional actors, resistance can also come from within.168  In Philadelphia, 
being a progressive justice doer office looks like an office restructuring.169  Progressive reformists 
who remain after restructuring may fight against opposition with community support and the idea 
that doing justice does not necessarily mean being severe in charging or bringing charges at all.  It 
is possible that data on community impact from leniency in charging may provide further support.  
For now, neither side of the argument seems to have an outright winning argument in terms of 
legal and ethical theory.  
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B. Out Theories on Bail Reform 
 Traditionally, bail was another phase where prosecutors could wield power to increase 
detention since posting bail was essentially the same as purchasing pre-trial release.170  The 
purpose of bail was always to assure court appearances and public safety, but this indirectly meant 
detention simply due to inability to pay.171  Historically, bail was sometimes set high as a means 
of punishment, but no matter the rationale, only led to the detention to indigent defendants.172  
Further, although constitutional guarantees against excessiveness exist, 173   traditionally the bail 
system meant disparate effects on these indigent defendants with only a limited range pretrial 
condition options.174 
 Under a “servant of the law theory,” prosecutors can rely on such constitutional guarantees 
in making decisions surrounding bail.  Unlike the phase of charging, each state has the background 
law of a bail statute.  However, many bail statutes, including New York’s, find the system not 
unconstitutional under either the equal protection or the due processes clauses of both the United 
States Constitution and their respective state constitutions.175  The right to bail is governed by a 
discretionary standard when not excessive, but progressive bail reformists like those in New York, 
have written in a right to bail when lacking sufficient reason for denial.176  The New York statute 
created the right to bail for misdemeanor cases and promotes discretion for greater offenses. 177 
 Progressive reformists who consider themselves either justice doers or servants of the law, 
exaggerate the anti-excessive boundary to rework bail.  Arguably, prosecutors promoting bail 
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reform could consider themselves doing justice for society or being supported under a “servant of 
the law” theory in the anti-excessive legal background to push for defendants to be released under 
the least restrictive conditions that assure court appearance and public safety.178   
 In making these blanket decisions for least restrictive bail conditions, prosecutors are 
exercising a refusal of enforcement that effectively rewrites law. 179  Like making blanket decisions 
for charging, progressive prosecutors are essentially policy impactors,180  and progressive offices 
like Philadelphia’s and New York’s, are using office wide mandates to not seek bail for lower-
level offenses.181  Although there is potential for similar separation of powers arguments to that of 
office wide mandates in decisions to charge, bail reformists face backlash that they are not 
necessarily doing justice.  The New York Police Department argues that such reform increases 
crime. 182  Even if later studies undermine this opposing argument, prosecutors who are basing 
their bail reform power in the legal guidance provided in bail statutes can still be undermined by 
other constitutional actors.  Some judges, like a few in the Bronx, New York use their power as 
the ultimate decisionmaker in bail setting183 to override the prosecutor’s discretion and combat 
bail reform by reverting to high monetary amounts.184  For now, the success of bail reform may 
depend more on how judges wield their power than how prosecutors are conceived. 
C. Theories to Forgive and Forget  
 Having a criminal record regulates the lives of ex-offenders long after they have left 
prison.185  Traditionally, being imprisoned for any portion of time meant facing imprisonment 
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upon reentry due to restrictions of rights relevant to housing, work, and education.186  Ex-offenders 
face further alienation, and with disparate proportions inside prison , people of color inevitably 
face disparate impact on the outside well.187  Expungement’s goal is to allow ex-offenders to move 
past prison and have a new future.188 
 Expungement reformists have the benefit under a “do justice” model that motivations 
behind the idea of expungement and the recent progressive goals have roots in sympathetic 
policymakers.189  States are varied in expungement remedies, procedural hurdles, and restrictions 
governing reentry.190  Under either a “do justice” model of not continuing to imprison those who 
have been released or a “servant of the law” theory rooted in the law of expungement itself, 
reformers desire to reduce such procedural hurdles and restrictions upon reentry.  Their efforts 
include expanding the number and type of convictions eligible for expungement,191 reducing 
waiting time to be able to petition for expungement,192 and lowering the number of procedural 
requirements that need to be met to satisfy the burden for petitioning.193  Some states go as far as 
a clean slate through automatic expungement of lessor offenses.194  States also vary on whether 
prosecutors are the first or final point of review of a petition for expungement.195  In states where 
prosecutors are judges on the merits of a petition, they bypass judicial authority to override them 
unlike in the bail context.196   
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 New York is an example where prosecutors have support to act in this quasi-judicial way 
under a “servant of the law” theory due to the law on expungement.  Specifically, prosecutors can 
produce a good cause showing under the interests of the public and the parties.197  Arguably, this 
good cause showing itself may resemble the “do justice” model on behalf of society.  To 
progressive prosecutors, doing justice at the expungement phase means more than simply not 
objecting to petitions, but taking affirmative actions as agents of change.  Such actions include 
meeting with employers to encourage hiring of people with past criminal records.198  Prosecutors 
who are acting as agents of change reference support beyond the limited legal guidance and 
theories that conceive their role, but in the ethical considerations of fostering a better criminal 
justice system.  
CONCLUSION 
 Twenty-first century prosecutors are forced to make blanket decisions in phases of the 
criminal justice system where guilt is not the factual issue before the court.  Although bargaining 
may be present, the phases of charging, bail, and expungement do not focus on adjudication.  
Traditionally, a prosecutor’s role was to be tough on crime and adversarial.199  Today, that tradition 
may not make sense.  The progressive prosecuting reform movement pushes for a more 
cooperative approach in the atypical phases of the criminal justice system.200  Some offices 
promote this culture in office-wide mandates to deny charging of certain crimes, promote bail 
reform, and represent class actions of expungement.  Offices like these have brought about a rise 
in prosecutors as primary actors for positive change in the face of systemic issues in the criminal 
justice system.   
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 Prosecutors are prime players in determining who to charge, who to release, and who has 
their record expunged.  Such phases have become broad points of focus in decriminalization.  Our 
nation traditionally continued to increase incarceration rates even as the leader in percentage of 
imprisoned people in the world,201  which directly continued to increase the disparate ratio of 
minorities in the system.202  This new prosecutorial approach can bring prosecutors to the forefront 
of combating the issues of mass incarceration and criminalization.  However, this new approach 
is arguably quasi-legislative and has been viewed as undermining priorities of other constitutional 
actors. 
 There is little governing law for the prosecutorial role in the atypical phases of charging, 
bail and expungement, but constitutional actors who oppose the movement have made separation 
of powers arguments against sweeping progressive reform.  Thus, beyond whether prosecutors 
should use their power to generate criminal justice reform, this paper asks the question of what 
legal and ethical principles should provide guidance.  Academics argue over guidance based on 
Supreme Court precedent, the separation of powers doctrine, the Model Rules, line prosecution 
norms and internal office culture.  Arguments extend to the concepts of uniformity versus diversity 
and whether communities should have more say over the actions of their elected prosecutors. 
 Comparing the traditional prosecutorial role against progressive prosecution in the phases 
of charging, bail, and expungement, makes clear that prosecutors have power to effect change in 
a criminal justice system faced with mass incarceration and disparate impact.  What is unclear is 
what legal and ethical principles should govern prosecutors as they wield this power.  Theories of 
prosecution may work differently for different phases and in different locations.  Ultimately, it will 
likely continue fall to the individual offices to determine their own conception of the prosecutor’s 
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role during the atypical phases of charging, bail, and expungement and the impact different 
conceptions at these phases may have on criminal justice reform. 
